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Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of
Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy*
Marcel Boyer†, Donatella Porrini‡
Résumé / Abstract
Nous analysons les conditions sous lesquelles les approches légale et
réglementaire peuvent être comparées dans le cadre d’un modèle d’économie
politique de l’implémentation de la politique environnementale. La première
partie de l’article décrit les caractéristiques essentielles des divers instruments à
comparer, à savoir un régime de responsabilité légale élargie aux prêteurs et un
régime de réglementation incitative, instruments typiquement utilisés aux
États-Unis et en Europe. Dans la deuxième partie, un modèle formel d’économie
politique est développé. La possibilité d’une capture de l’agence de
réglementation est introduite sous forme réduite par la surévaluation de la valeur
sociale de la rente informationnelle des entreprises. Nous montrons qu’un régime
de réglementation incitative peut être plus ou moins performant en termes de
bien-être qu’un régime de responsabilité élargie, stricte et solidaire. Nous
analysons en profondeur trois facteurs principaux de cette comparaison, à savoir
le différentiel de coût entre les niveaux faible et élevé de la protection
environnementale, le coût social des fonds publics et le facteur de surévaluation.
We analyze the conditions under which a legal intervention can be
compared to a regulatory framework in the context of a political economy model
of environmental policy. The first part of the paper describes the characteristics
of the different instruments we want to compare: first, an assignment of legal
liability, focusing on the case of extended lender liability, and second, an
incentive regulation framework. We briefly describe the application of those
instruments in the United States and Europe. In the second part a formal economy
model is presented where the possibility of capture of the regulatory agency is
modeled in a reduced-form fashion through an overvaluation of the social value
of the informational rent of the firms. We show that compared with an extended,
strict, joint and several liability system, a regulatory system may perform better or
worse from a welfare point of view. Three factors underlying this comparison are
discussed in some depth, namely the differential cost between low and high levels
                                                
*
 Corresponding Author: Marcel Boyer, CIRANO, 2020 University Street, 25th floor, Montréal, Qc, Canada
H3A 2A5 Tel.: (514) 985-4002 Fax: (514) 985-4035 email: boyerm@cirano.umontreal.ca
We want to thank Claire Domenget, Patrick González, Yolande Hiriart, Ejan Mackaay and Stephen Shavell for their
comments. Donatella Porrini acknowledges financial support from MURST 1998 Project “Regulation and Self-
Regulation” (Università LIUC, Castellanza, Italy). We remain of course solely responsible for the content of this
article.
†
  Department of Economics, Université de Montréal and CIRANO
‡
  Istituto di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Milano
of environmental protection activities, the social cost of public funds and the
overvaluation factor.
Mots Clés : Politique environnementale, responsabilité élargie, CERCLA, capture des
régulateurs, instruments
Keywords: Environmental policy, extended liability, CERCLA, regulatory capture,
instruments
11 Introduction
From a law and economics point of view, the regulation of environmentally risky activities is an
alternative to a system of liability assignment. \Regulation and tort law are alternative methods
(though often used in combination) for preventing accidents. The former requires a potential
injurer to take measures to prevent the accident from occurring. The latter seeks to deter the
accident by making the potential injurer liable for the costs of accident should it occur." (Landes
and Posner, 1984, p. 417). We want here to review and characterize, in an incomplete infor-
mation political economy framework, the conditions under which an environmental regulation
approach is superior to an environmental liability one.
We develop in this paper a formal analysis of the comparison between dierent policy in-
struments to implement a given set of environmental protection objectives,
1
including a political
economy explanation of the choice of instruments.
2
The rst instrument we consider is the as-
signment of a CERCLA type liability,
3
that is, a strict, retroactive, joint and several liability
on the owners and operators of the rm responsible for a catastrophic environmental disaster.
More precisely, we model an extended lender liability rule whereby private banks nancing the
responsible rm are considered as liable operators if the latter is unable to cover the damages
and compensation from its own assets. The second instrument in our comparison consists in
a regulation framework. After the environmental legislation of the 70s in the United States,
the federal government played an extensive role in regulating air pollution, water pollution,
hazardous and solid waste disposal, as well as pesticide use, among other environmental risks.
More precisely we consider here an incentive regulation system based on a menu of contracts
and subject to capture by the regulated rms.
Boyer and Laont (1999) argue that two types of meaningful comparisons of instruments are
possible. In the rst type, one considers exogenous constraints on instruments and then various
constrained instruments can be compared. In the second type, instruments, equivalent in the
complete contracting framework, can be meaningfully compared given some imperfections in the
economy outside the control of the social or constitutional planner.
4
The origin of this imperfect
control of the social planner must be carefully justied. Otherwise, the results could be simply
a direct and uninteresting consequence of articial constraints on the social planner.
2The extended lender liability option
The common law tort system, administered by the courts and governed principally by state law in
the United States, provides a mechanism for creating incentives for care and for compensating
victims, property losses and health injuries by a strict liability system.
5
Alongside the tort
system, there exist a system of private and public insurance both for the liability of rms and
for the consequences on individuals. In the 80s, the United States Congress enacted CERCLA
and created a Superfund for the quick and eective cleanup of dangerous waste sites.
6
It gave the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power to bring damage actions to recover cleanup
costs against the owners and operators of the facility directly responsible for releases.
We want to concentrate here on an important aspect of a liability system that makes all
owners and operators retroactively, strictly, jointly and severally liable, namely the extension
of liability to the lenders. In spite of a secured interest exemption clause protecting nancial
institutions holding indicia of ownership on the rm's assets,
7
the United States courts have
repeatedly considered secured lenders as owners or operators under CERCLA, insofar as their
involvement in the operations of the rm exceeded the level warranted to secure their interest.
8
A lenders' liability system was dened by the courts decisions, for instance in the following
landmark cases involving the bankruptcy of the primary responsible rm: USA v. Mirabile,
9
USA v. Maryland Bank & Trust,
10
USA v. Fleet factors,
11
and Bergsoe Metal v. East Asiatic.
12
But these cases appeared to articulate potentially conicting rules of liability regarding the type
and degree of involvement making the lenders jointly liable with the responsible rms.
13
To
clarify this confused situation, the EPA issued in 1992 the so called Final Rule
14
under which a
lender would be liable for cleanup costs if it participated in the management of the borrower's
operations by exercising management control over either the day to day operations of the facility
or over its environmental compliance eorts. In the years following the EPA's nal rule, some
court decisions were based on this statement.
15
But in the 1994 case Kelley v. EPA,
16
the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeal held that Congress in enacting CERCLA did not give the EPA authority
to eect the imposition of liability and therefore invalidated the EPA's nal rule.
17
In 1996, the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act
18
claried the limits of liability for secured creditors by validating the EPA's lender liability rule.
3According to this Act, lenders and secured creditors must `participate in the management of the
facility' to be held liable as an `owner or operator' of a contaminated site and a secured creditor's
simple nancing transactions should not imply a joint, several, retroactive and strict liability for
environmental contamination. But, while the Act provides welcomed relief for secured creditors,
it does not completely insulate lenders and duciaries from environmental liability and the
question remains regarding which precise steps must be taken to ensure a limitation of liability
for lenders.
19
In addition to the lender liability rule developed through the jurisprudence, the CERCLA li-
ability system raises other issues. First, suing all the potentially responsible parties or targeting
some `deep pocket' ones to recover response, cleanup costs and damages, as well as coordinating
numerous parties with conicting interests and nding an agreement on a cost allocation plan
may generate very high transaction costs. Second, the involvement of many potentially respon-
sible parties implies that the distribution among polluting parties of the needed compensation
costs can create incentive problems such as the allocation of resources to legal strategies rather
than to accident prevention.
20
In addition to this transaction cost problem, the CERCLA liability system was not supported
by a signicant development in the insurance market.
21
The main problems are the following.
The standard insurance policies do not t the CERCLA retroactive liability system because
they do not cover claims made before or after the validity period of the insurance contract.
Moreover, because both the premium and the deductible in the policies are extremely high, only
a few insurance companies in the United States issue them and many lending institutions opt
for selnsurance.
22
In Europe, a unied regime of liability for environmental damages is still in the making.
23
The problem of harmonizing dierent national legal regimes from the standpoint of both market
integration and environmental protection that cuts across traditional administrative and legal
boundaries raises diÆcult issues.
24
In this context, the White Paper on Environmental Liability
of February 2000 aims at determining who should pay for the cleanup and restoration costs of
the environmental damage resulting from human acts. The question whether the costs should be
paid by society at large through the tax system or by the polluter when it can be identied was
answered by the imposition of liability on the party responsible for causing the damage. The EC
4opted essentially for a strict (no fault) liability system that is eective only for future damage
where polluters can be identied, damage is quantiable and a causal connection can be shown.
Given the general rule that the polluter must always be the rst actor a claim is addressed to,
the White Paper nevertheless recommends a form of extended liability rule. It states that the
persons who exercises control (the `operators') of an activity by which the damage is caused
should be the liable party and it species that lenders not exercising operational control should
not be liable. Furthermore, in the nal part of the White Paper that deals with the overall
economic impact of environmental liability in the European Community, it is stated that the
liability system generally protects economic operators in the nancial sectors, unless they have
operational responsibilities.
The EC White Paper liability system while similar to the United States system diers from
it on many important aspects. First, both of them are based on a strict liability regime in the
sense that liability comes from the causal link between the actor and the damage and whether
the actor's behavior was proper or negligent is irrelevant. Second, while the CERCLA system
is applied retroactively, the EC White Paper provides a non-retroactive application.
25
Third,
only a mitigated joint and several liability regime is provided in the European case in the sense
that a party is allowed to provide convincing arguments that it is only partially liable. Fourth,
instead of covering every damage including the damage to natural resources, the European
system covers only traditional damages, such as personal injury and damage to property, and
the decontamination of sites. Fifth, the objective of the United States system of recovering
the environmental damage from liable parties is supported also by the creation of a Superfund
while no such fund is established by the White Paper. Sixth, the set of actors who can be held
liable is the same, namely the `operators' of the rm, and both systems specify that lenders not
exercising operational control should not be held liable, the so called secured interest exemption
rule.
26
The regulation option
An alternative instrument to implement the environmental policy is a regulatory system where
an authority or an agency can use a number of ways to control environmental damages and
reduce the probability of environmental accidents. The traditional approach is the command
5and control procedure of setting and implementing pollution standards. A more recent approach
rests on incentive market based instruments, as emission taxation, marketable permits and oset
trading.
27
In the command and control approach based on a mandatory technology or abatement
standard, the regulator such the United States Environmental Protection Agency can order the
rms to limit their emissions, to emit no more than a specied amount of a pollutant and/or to
install a particular abatement technology. The regulator monitors over the time the compliance
of rms with the standards and emission limits through the conduct of inspections, actions in
federal courts and negotiated settlements with polluters.
28
The incentive market based instruments are alternative tools that are typically based on the
menu of contracts framework or on a system of marketable permits. The latter essentially works
in the following way: the regulator grants a plant or public utility a number of permits to emit
a given amount of a pollutant; if the facility is able to reduce its emissions, preferably through
the use of newer technologies, it can sell its remaining emission permits to another facility that
is unable to meet its quota.
Looking at the United States experience, air pollution control under the federal Clean Air
Act (1970-1990) followed in its early stages a command and control approach but with the
increasing knowledge and experimentation of market based solutions switched to markets of
pollution `rights'. Given that the main goal of the Clean Air Act was the attainment of national
ambient air quality standards, the Congress asked the EPA to establish the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs) for pervasive air pollutants. Later on, euent taxes and
marketable emission rights were taken into consideration in order to overcome the shortcomings
of the command and control instruments in terms of monitoring, enforcement capabilities, their
high level of administrative costs.
In the EC, the European Environmental Agency (EEA) has a limited regulatory role for two
reasons. First, the EEA exercises mainly the role of providing objective, comparable and reliable
information that member States or the Community at large may use to develop measures to
protect the environment, to evaluate the results of said measures, and to educate the public
about the state of the environment. Second, the EEA has very limited resources: the agency
has a sta of approximately 60 persons and its limited nancial resources curtail its capacity
6of addressing directly and credible the environmental problems of the Community. Therefore
in every single member State, the regulation follows the national legislation and the choice of
instruments is specic to each state.
Liability versus regulation
To compare the two policy instruments we can follow a law and economics approach analyzing
their impacts in terms of social welfare.
29
This kind of analysis balances the benets from the
risky activities with the costs of precautionary care, the expected level of damages (probability
and severity), the administrative expenses associated with these policies, and the net social cost
of the informational rents.
A strict liability system is typically applied to risks created by abnormally hazardous activ-
ities and against defendants for all injuries caused by their conduct. The victim les an action
claiming a causal link between the defendant's conduct and the plainti's injury or disease and
the system relies on a case by case adjudication. Strict liability regime has the advantage of
internalizing environmental risks both from the incentive and the compensation points of view.
But it has some practical disadvantages: in many cases the victims are widely dispersed with
none of them suÆciently motivated to initiate a legal action, harm may appear only after a long
delay, specically responsible polluters may be diÆcult to identify, determining the causal link
may be diÆcult, inconsistent verdicts may emerge, delays in court proceedings may be very long
and the system may be more protable for lawyers and experts than for the victims.
On the other hand, a regulation system is typically characterized by a centralized structure.
Its advantages are based on the fact that it is well suited to set policies regarding the deni-
tion and implementation of standards. The centralized search facilities, the continual oversight
of problems and a broad array of regulatory tools can make the regulation system capable of
systematically assessing environmental risks and of implementing a comprehensive set of poli-
cies. But, regulatory agencies may be not very exible in adapting to changing conditions and
centralized command structure relying on expert advice may be subject to political pressure as
well as to collusion and capture by the regulated rms.
30
We can compare the two policy instruments on the basis of the following features: the level
of administrative costs, the magnitude of the damages in case of an environmental accident, the
7private knowledge of the parties regarding the causal factors of accident probability and the risk
of capture or collusion.
The cost of a liability system includes the administrative expenses incurred by the private
and the public parties, namely the cost of optimally controlling the probability of accidents,
the legal expenses and the public expenses for maintaining legal institutions. The cost of the
regulatory system includes the public expenses for maintaining the regulatory agencies and the
private costs of compliance. One advantage of the liability system is that a signicant part of
the administrative costs is incurred only if a suit occurs. On the other hand the administrative
costs of a regulation system are incurred whether or not the harm occurs because the process
of regulation is costly by itself and the regulator needs to collect information about the parties,
their activities and the risks.
A second element of the comparison refers to who bears the cost of environmental damage.
In a regulation system, the costs are usually directly or indirectly covered by the public parties
when due care was exercised by the rms according to the standards dened by the regulatory
agency. In a liability regime, these costs are imposed on the responsible private parties, if and
when a suit occurs, given their capacity to pay and their limited liability. Both systems may
require some form of compulsory insurance for the losses in excess of the assets of the rm but
the liability system can also rely on an extended liability assignment according to which most
or all deep pocket stakeholders (suppliers, partners and nanciers) of the rm may be made
strictly, jointly and severally responsible for the damages.
A third important element of the comparison is the distribution of knowledge among parties
regarding the benets of activities, the cost of reducing risks and the probability and the severity
of accidents. Sometimes the nature of the activities carried out by the rms is such that the
private parties have better knowledge of the benets and costs of reducing risks. In such a case a
liability system has the advantage of making the private parties residual claimants of the control
of risks while a regulation system suers from the lack of information leading to overestimation
or underestimation of the costs and benets of the risks (probability and/or severity). But it may
also happen that the regulator has better knowledge of those risks because of the possibility of
centralizing information and decisions, in particular when a better knowledge of the risk factors
requires a special expertise to be shared through dierent cases and situations.
31
8A fourth relevant feature in the comparison is the possibility of capture and collusion between
the enforcers and the parties. The enforcers may be inuenced by external pressure in both
systems, but one may reasonably argue that the courts are less likely to be captured than the
regulating agencies.
On the basis of theses dierences between the two policy instruments, we will present in
the next section a model based on the stylized features of an extended lender liability system
and of an incentive regulation system where the asymmetric information between parties (moral
hazard) and the possibility of capture are explicitly present.
2 The model
We consider a two period context where a rm can, in each period, invest an amount F to
generate a low prot level of 
L
with probability  or a high prot level of 
H
with probability
(1   ), with expected prot  = 
L
+ (1   )
H
.
32
The stochastic revenues are i.i.d. and the
discount rate is zero. The rm can choose self-protection activities e that reduce the probability
p(e) of a major environmental accident generating damages of d > 
H
. Therefore if a major
environmental disaster occurs in period 2, it sends the responsible rm into bankruptcy. We
will assume that the self-protection activities are exerted in period 1 and that an accident can
happen in period 2 only, if it does occur. The self-protection activities can be at the high level
e
h
or at the low level e
`
; we will assume for simplicity that the cost of the low level e
`
is zero
and that the (dierential) cost of the high level is  . Let p(e
h
) = p
h
and p(e
`
) = p
`
. We will
assume that  < (p
`
  p
h
)d and therefore it is socially optimal in a rst best sense that the
rm chooses the high level of self-protection activities.
We will assume for simplicity that the rm has no equity and must borrow each period the
full amount F in order to remain in business. We consider two regimes. In the rst regime, the
rm interacts with a private banker who is the residual liable party for environmental damages
caused by the rm, that is for damages above the assets of the rm. The rm is assumed to be
risk neutral but with limited liability. The bank is assumed to be a deep pocket private bank
whose limited liability is irrelevant. In the second regime, the rm interacts with a regulator who
is directly responsible for implementing environmental protection policies to maximize welfare
but who is subject to capture by the regulated rm. Under the extended lender liability regime,
9the rm borrows from the private bank. Under the regulatory regime, we assume for simplicity
that the rm borrows from the regulator. Clearly, a real regulator does not nance the rm but in
her complex relationship with the rm, she would worry about the nancial viability of the rm
and also the impact of nancial contracts on incentives for self-protection activities. Creating a
direct nancial link between the regulator and the rm is a reduced form representation of the
structural relationship between the regulator, the rm and the nancial markets.
We want to concentrate here on the prevention of environmental accidents and so, the in-
formation structure we consider is as follows: although the realized prot level is observable by
everyone, the level of self-protection activities is a private information of the rm and is there-
fore observable neither by the regulator nor by the bank. The timing of the interplay between
the principal (either the public regulator or the private bank) and the rm is as follows in both
regimes considered. The principal oers a nancial contract to the rm making explicit the
payments to be made in each period if the rm is nanced. If the contract is accepted, the
rm invests F and chooses the care level e. The prot level of the rst period is then observed
and a payment is made to the principal according to the nancial contract. In period 2, the
rm is renanced or not and if renanced, it invests F again, the prot level is observed and a
catastrophic accident occurs or not. A payment is made to the principal according to the nan-
cial contract and, if an accident occurs, cleanup costs are distributed according to the liability
system in force.
We will characterize and compare three solutions. The benchmark solution will correspond
to the case where a benevolent regulator, not subject to capture, chooses the nancial contract
oered to the rm in order to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function. The second solution
will be obtained when a private bank, under an extended lender liability system, chooses and
oers a nancial contract that maximizes its own expected prot function in which the infor-
mational rent of the rm is not present. The third solution will be obtained when the captured
regulator chooses the nancial contract oered to the rm. In so doing, she maximizes a dis-
torted social welfare function in which the informational rent of the rm will be overvalued. In a
sense, there are three possible principals in this context: the benevolent regulator, the captured
regulator and the private bank.
10
3 Moral hazard in environmental protection
Clearly, the asymmetric information structure and the limited liability of the rm makes the
internalization of externalities a diÆcult problem. If a major environmental disaster occurs, the
rm will be `judgment-proof' for damages above its value, that is here, its prot level. Under
limited liability, moral hazard variables cannot be costlessly controlled by imposing appropriate
penalties on the risk neutral rm and the latter will in general be able to capture an informational
rent. Accident-preventing activities by the rm must then be induced by higher rewards rather
than sti penalties since the limited liability constraint imposes a limit on those penalties.
Given that the prot level is observed by all parties, the principal is able to oer a nancial
contract where the repayment level is a function of the prot level. But because the level of self-
protection activities is not observed, the repayment level must be independent of those activities.
So we will assume that the nancial contract stipulates that in period t, the principal will lend
the amount F and ask for repayment levels of R
t
L
if realized prot is 
L
and R
t
H
if realized prot
is 
H
. A nancial contract is therefore a 4-tuple of repayments for loans of F in each period:
(R
1
L
; R
1
H
; R
2
L
; R
2
H
). The objective function of the principal will depend on the setting, that is,
on whether the principal is a benevolent regulator, a captured regulator or a private bank, and
whether the principal has priority or not over the rm's prot in case of bankruptcy. We will
assume here that if an accident occurs, the rm must pay for the damages at least up to the
maximal amount made possible by its limited liability. Since d > 
H
, it means that all its prot
will be taken away if an accident occurs and no payment is then made to the principal.
Under our assumptions, the full information rst best allocation entails clearly a high level
of self-protection activities e
h
and a loan/investment F in both periods i
2   2F   p
h
d   0; (1)
a condition which is satised if we have a benevolent regulator or a captured regulator. The two
regulators dier by their treatment of the rm's informational rent but since the rent is zero
under full information, this dierential treatment has no impact. In the absence of extended
lender liability, the private bank lends in each period i
maxf 2   2F   p
`
; 2   2F   p
h
   g  0; (2)
11
leading to overinvestment because of the partial, rather than full, internalization of the exter-
nality. With the extended liability of the deep pocket private bank, the full information rst
best allocation is also achieved at the Nash equilibrium of the game played by the rm and the
bank. The bank's liability induces it to fully internalize the externality and being risk neutral,
it prefers the optimal level of eort e
h
. Hence, one may suggest that a possible solution to
the full internalization of the externality created by environmental accidents is to make the pri-
vate bank responsible for damages if the judgment-proof rm it nances causes a catastrophic
environmental accident.
33
But when the principal, whether it is the benevolent regulator, the captured regulator or
the private bank, suers from agency problems in its relationship with the rm, the possibility
of achieving the rst best must be qualied. As mentioned before, we consider in this paper
that the rm's prot is observable by the regulators and the private bank but that they all
face a moral hazard problem regarding the level of the rm's accident preventing activities.
We will characterize rst the social optimum to be used as a benchmark. This benchmark
corresponds to the case of the benevolent regulator who maximizes the proper social welfare
function but in so doing must take into account the private information of the rm regarding its
self-protection activities. Next, we will characterize the Nash equilibrium obtained for the game
involving the rm and the private bank under the extended lender liability regime. Then, we
will characterize the solution obtained when the regulator is captured. Finally, we will compare
the three solutions and derive some propositions on the relative social eÆciency of the regime
of incentive regulation implemented by a captured regulator and the regime of extended lender
liability.
The social optimum under moral hazard.
Because of asymmetric information, the full information rst best allocation is not achievable
anymore. The proper benchmark for our analysis is the social optimum under moral hazard be-
cause even the benevolent regulator whose objective is to maximize social welfare must take into
account the agency costs. We will assume that the social welfare function (SWF) is utilitarian
and that there is a social cost of public funds (1 + ) coming from distortions due to taxation:
it costs (1 + )T to raise T through general taxation.
34
The nancial payments made by the
12
rm to the benevolent regulator acting here as a nancier together with the cost F invested
by the benevolent regulator will enter the social welfare function with a weight of (1 + ), in
the rst case because they allow a reduction in taxation and in the second case because the in-
vestment F must be nanced through taxation, directly or indirectly. We will assume also that
the expected damage of an accident enters the social welfare function with a weight of (1 + )
because the government will have to cover that cost in one way or another and nance it through
taxation. Given that the rm's net utility (rent) is not observable by the benevolent regulator,
and therefore not taxable, this net utility enters the social welfare function with a weight of 1.
It will therefore be eÆcient that the benevolent regulator recuperates any observable prot of
the rm.
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The rm will be left with its unobservable informational rent which will then have
a weight of 1 in the social welfare function. The socially optimal program of the benevolent
regulator will therefore minimize the rent left to the rm because of its smaller weight in the
social welfare function. The existence of a social cost of public funds is an important and re-
alistic feature of regulatory frameworks. It makes income distribution relevant, although in an
unusual sense, for environmental protection. Were that cost equal to zero, the regulator would
not care whether the rm makes monopoly prots or capture signicant informational rents as
long as the eÆcient production level is realized. The existence of a positive  together with the
assumption of a regulator acting as nancier will allow us to develop a tractable yet realistic
model of instrument choice in environmental protection policy.
The social optimum under moral hazard maximizes the expected social welfare under the
incentive compatibility, limited liability and individual rationality constraints of the privately
informed rm. The rm will choose a high level of self-protection activities i it nds protable
to incur the dierential cost  , that is, i its expected net utility in the is larger with e = e
h
than with e = e
`
, that is i:
(1  p
h
)[   (R
2
L
+ (1  )R
2
H
)]   (1  p
`
)[   (R
2
L
+ (1  )R
2
H
)]
which can be rewritten as
   R
2
L
  (1  )R
2
H

 
p
`
  p
h
; (3)
which is the incentive compatibility constraint to be satised if the principal wants to induce
the rm to select e
h
. The limited liability constraints of the rm simply require that the repay-
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ment levels not exceed the corresponding prot levels. Finally, the rm's individual rationality
constraint is that its net utility be non negative (assuming an exogenous utility normalized at
zero). The rm's expected net utility is 0 under e = e
`
and given by its informational rent
under e = e
h
:   R
1
L
  (1  )R
1
H
  +(1 p
h
)
 
   R
2
L
  (1  )R
2
H

. Distortions created
by the presence of moral hazard will occur only when the combination of the limited liability
constraints and the incentive compatibility constraint (3) require to give up a (costly) rent to the
rm. The existence of a social cost of public funds requires that R
1
L
= 
L
, R
1
H
= 
H
and that
(3) be satised with a strict equality: because  > 0, it is socially better to use the prot of the
rm to reduce the general distortionary taxes. Therefore, the net utility level or informational
rent of the rm is
R    + (1  p
h
)
 
p
`
  p
h
> 0: (4)
Under the socially optimal nancial contract, the benevolent regulator collects an expected
amount of
 + (1  p
h
)(R
2
L
+ (1  )R
2
H
)  p
h
[(d R
2
L
) + (1  )(d R
2
H
)]  2F: (5)
Proposition 1: If

1 + 
R+  (p
`
  p
h
)d; (6)
the social optimum (the benevolent regulator solution) is characterized by a high level of accident
preventing activities and an investment F in both periods i
2   2F   p
h
d   

1 + 
R  0: (7)
If (6) is not satised, the social optimum is characterized by a low level of accident preventing
activities and an investment in both periods i
2   2F   p
`
d  0: k (8)
Proof: Let us rst derive the social welfare when e
h
is induced. We must solve the following
program
Max f(1 + )[R
1
L
+ (1  )R
1
H
+ (1  p
h
)(R
2
L
+ (1  )R
2
H
)  2F ]
 (1 + )p
h
(d  )
+[(   R
1
L
  (1  )R
1
H
  ) + (1  p
h
)(   R
2
L
  (1  )R
2
H
)]g
9
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
;
(9)
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subject to the incentive compatibility condition (3) and the individual rationality condition
   R
1
L
  (1  )R
1
H
  + (1  p
h
)(   R
2
L
  (1  )R
2
H
)  0: (10)
The solution entails R
1
L
+ (1  )R
1
H
=  and (3) satised with a strict equality because of the
dierent weights in the SWF. Accordingly, the social welfare (9) can be written as
(1 + )[   2F + (1  p
h
)(  
 
p
`
  p
h
)  p
h
(d  )] + [(1  p
h
)
 
p
`
  p
h
  ];
hence as
(1 + )[2   2F   p
h
d  ]  [(1  p
h
)
 
p
`
  p
h
  ];
that is,
(1 + )[2   2F   p
h
d  ]  R: (11)
Therefore, investment should take place if (7) is satised. If e = e
`
, no rent is left to the rm,
the social welfare becomes
(1 + )(2   2F   p
`
d) (12)
and investment must take place in both periods if (12) is positive. Comparing the social welfare
levels (11) and (12), we obtain that e = e
h
must be induced if

1 + 
R+  (p
`
  p
h
)d; (13)
where the right hand side is the incremental value and the left hand side is the incremental
cost, including the social cost of the informational rent, of the high level of accident preventing
activities. This completes the proof. }
Proposition 1 diers from the rst best full information rule because of the presence of R,
the rent to be given up to the rm when the benevolent regulator wants to induce a high level
of accident prevention activities. The benevolent regulator cannot avoid giving up that rent
to induce a high level of accident preventing activities and will therefore take into account the
net social cost of that rent, namely R. If that cost is large, the benevolent regulator may
prefer, in maximizing the SWF, to induce a low level of care e
`
generating a high probability
p
`
of environmental accidents. It may even turn out that the rm will not be nanced by the
benevolent regulator even if it would be in a full information context. Both when making the
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investment decision and deciding on the optimal level of care activities, the social cost of this
rent must be accounted for. As  decreases, the net social cost of the rm's informational rent
decreases and condition (13) converges to the condition for e = e
h
under full information. As 
increases, the net social cost of giving up a rent to the rm goes up and condition (13) converges
to the condition, to be derived below, for e = e
h
under extended lender liability since =(1 + )
converges to 1 as !1.
The Nash equilibrium when the rm faces a private bank.
We now consider the case where the rm faces a private banker who is liable for environmental
damages caused by the rm when the latter is unable to cover those damages from its assets,
here its prots. Clearly as in the above case of a benevolent regulator acting as nancier, the
private bank can oer a care-inducing contract to the rm but in so doing will concede a rent
to the rm as expressed by (3). Otherwise, the bank can capture the whole prot. The bank's
expected prot under a contract inducing a high level of care activities e
h
is, using (3),
 + (1  p
h
)(  
 
p
`
  p
h
)  p
h
(d  )  2F
that is
2   2F   p
h
d  (1  p
h
)
 
p
`
  p
h
; (14)
while under the alternative contract inducing the low level of care e
`
, its prot is
2   2F   p
`
d: (15)
Proposition 2: Under extended lender liability, the private bank induces a high level of accident
preventing activities less often than the benevolent regulator does. When the bank decides to
induce e = e
h
conceding a rent R to the rm, it lends less often than the benevolent regulator
does. When, in spite of lender liability, the bank opts to induce the low level of care activities
e
`
leaving no rent to the rm, it lends as often as the benevolent regulator does in that case. k
Proof: Comparing (14) and (15), the private bank opts for inducing e = e
h
i
R+ < (p
`
  p
h
)d (16)
while the benevolent regulator induces such a level of care when (13) is satised. Comparing the
two conditions shows that the private bank opts for the low level of care activities more often
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because

1 + 
R+ < R+ :
Considering (14) and using (4), the private bank will lend with e
h
i
2   2F   p
h
d   R  0: (17)
Comparing (17) and (7), obtained in the case of the benevolent regulator, shows that the private
bank lends less often than the benevolent regulator does. Similarly, since (15) and (8) are the
same then the private bank lends as often as the benevolent regulator does in that case since no
rent is left to the rm and the bank internalizes completely the cost of an accident. }
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that under the extended lender liability, the cost of an
accident for the bank is the same as for the benevolent regulator and so the comparison between
the two solutions rests on their dierent evaluation of the rm's rent when e = e
h
is induced. For
the bank, the cost of the rent is equal to the value of the rent itself R while for the benevolent
regulator the net cost is smaller, namely

1+
R, because she considers the social value of that
rent in the SWF. This makes the bank less willing than the benevolent regulator not only to
lend but also to induce a high level of accident preventing activities. Hence this unavoidable
informational rent leads to insuÆcient nancing and too little care activities induced by the
bank. If the bank chooses to induce e = e
`
, there is no rent and therefore the bank lends as
often as the benevolent regulator.
The biased optimum when the regulator is captured
If the regulator is captured, she will in a sense benet from the rm's rent one way or another,
that is, through bribes, collusive interests, perks, future employment opportunities and so on.
It will be as if she puts too much weight (overvaluation) on the rm's informational rent in the
objective function, that is, as if she undervalues the social cost of that rent in comparison with
the benchmark case of the benevolent regulator. This will make the captured regulator less keen
to reduce this rent to its minimum.
We will assume that the rent R of the rm, when e = e
h
is induced, enters the captured
regulator's objective function with a weight of K, where 1 < K < (1 + ). The captured
regulator's objective function is a biased version of the social welfare function, namely when e
h
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is induced,
(1 + )[   2F + (1  p
h
)(  
 
p
`
  p
h
)  p
h
(d  )] +KR;
that is, using (3),
(1 + )[2   2F   p
h
d  ]  (1 +  K)R (18)
and, when e
`
is induced,
(1 + )[2   2F   p
`
d]: (19)
We have:
Proposition 3: The captured regulator induces a high level of accident preventing activities
more often than the benevolent regulator does. When she induces e = e
h
conceding a rent
to the rm, she lends more often than called for, conditionally on e = e
h
, by the second best
optimal investment rule. When the captured regulator induces a low level of accident preventing
activities e
`
leaving no rent to the rm, she lends as often as called for, conditionally on e = e
`
,
by the second best optimal investment rule. k
Proof: Comparing (18) and (19), we obtain that the captured regulator induces e = e
h
i
1 +  K
1 + 
R+ < (p
`
  p
h
)d
which compared with (6) shows that the captured regulator induces e
h
too often since
1 +  K
1 + 
R+ <

1 + 
R+ :
When e
h
is induced, the captured regulator's objective function (18) is positive i
2   2F   p
h
d   
1 +  K
1 + 
R  0:
Since
1+ K
1+
<

1+
, the social cost of the rent is undervalued and therefore, the capture of
the regulator leads to overinvestment, conditionally on e = e
h
, in the environmentally risky
activities. When e
`
is induced, we observe from (12) and (19) that the investment rules of the
captured regulator and of the benevolent regulator are the same. }
4 The choice of instruments
Let SWF
CR
be the value of the SWF (9) with the solution, level of care activities and investment
rule, implemented by the captured regulator, as dened in proposition 3. Let SWF
PB
be the
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value of the SWF with the solution, level of care activities and investment rule, implemented by
the private bank under extended lender liability, as dened in proposition 2. Let us dene the
correspondences 
;;  as follows:
SWF
CR
> SWF
PB
i  2 
()
SWF
CR
= SWF
PB
i  2 ()
SWF
CR
< SWF
PB
i  2  ():
We now turn to the characterization and illustration of those correspondences.
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But rst, let
us recall the main result of our analysis so far.
When e = e
`
is induced, the investment rules are the same in the three cases considered,
namely the benevolent regulator, the private bank and the captured regulator.
When the benevolent regulator is the principal, we obtain that the probability that e = e
h
will be induced is the probability that

1+
R + is less than (p
`
  p
h
)d and the probability
that an investment 2F will be made in the rm is the probability that

1+
R +  is smaller
than 2  2F   p
h
d. This is the benchmark case corresponding to the second best solution, that
is, the social optimum under moral hazard.
When the private bank is the principal, the probability that e = e
h
will be induced is now the
probability that R+ is less than (p
`
 p
h
)d and the probability that an investment 2F will be
made in the rm is now the probability that R+ is smaller than 2  2F   p
h
d. Compared
with the benchmark case, this solution represents a loss of social welfare because of not enough
incentive for care, hence too many accidents, and not enough investment in the environmentally
risky operations of the rm. The loss in welfare is due to the bank's overvaluation of the net
social cost of the informational rent captured by the rm, that is to the bank's failure to consider
the social value of the rent.
When the captured regulator is the principal, we then obtain that the probability that e = e
h
will be induced is the probability that
1+ K
1+
R+ is less than (p
`
  p
h
)d and the probability
that an investment 2F will be made in the rm is then the probability that
1+ K
1+
R + is
smaller than 2 2F p
h
d. Again, compared with the benchmark case, this solution represents a
loss of social welfare because of too much incentive for care, hence too few accidents (conditional
on the level of nancing), and too much investment in the environmentally risky operations of
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the rm. The loss in welfare is due to the captured regulator's undervaluation of the net social
cost of the informational rent captured by the rm, that is the captured regulator's overweighing
of the social value of the rent.
The investment rules in the three contexts are the same if e = e
`
is induced. But they dier
if e = e
h
is induced. Moreover the conditions under which e
h
is induced dier between the three
contexts.
 In the benevolent regulator (BR) solution:
e = e
h
i

1 + 
R+  (p
`
  p
h
)d;
that is, using (4), i
 
(1 + )(p
`
  p
h
)d
1 + 
1  p
h
p
`
  p
h
: (20)
Investment 2F will take place i
2   2F   p
h
d   

1 + 
R  0;
that is, i
 
(1 + )(2   2F   p
h
d)
1 + 
1  p
h
p
`
  p
h
: (21)
 In the private bank (PB) solution:
e = e
h
i
R+  (p
`
  p
h
)d;
that is, i
 
(p
`
  p
h
)
2
d
1  p
h
: (22)
Investment 2F will take place i
2   2F   p
h
d   R  0;
that is, i
 
(p
`
  p
h
)(2   2F   p
h
d)
1  p
h
: (23)
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 In the captured regulator (CR) solution:
e = e
h
i
1 +  K
1 + 
R+  (p
`
  p
h
)d;
that is, i
 
(1 + )(p
`
  p
h
)d
K +
(1  p
h
)(1 +  K)
p
`
  p
h
: (24)
Investment 2F will take place i
2   2F   p
h
d   
1 +  K
1 + 
R  0;
that is, i
 
(1 + )(2   2F   p
h
d)
K +
(1  p
h
)(1 +  K)
p
`
  p
h
: (25)
Suppose that  = 0. In that case, the BR implements the rst best solution since, although the
rm can capture an informational rent, that rent has no social cost. So the BR induces e
h
since
by assumption  < (p
`
  p
h
)d and nances the rm i 2   2F   p
h
d     0. The PB
solution is independent of the value of . Using (4), we obtain that the PB induces e
h
, leaving
a rent R to the rm, i
 
p
`
  p
h
1  p
h
(p
`
  p
h
)d:
Otherwise, the PB induces e
`
, leaving no rent to the rm. Conditionally on e = e
`
, the private
bank lends as often as called for by the rst best rule since there is no rent. The social loss in
welfare in this case is the welfare loss due to inducing e
`
rather than e
h
. Moreover, even when
the PB prefers to induce e
h
, it does not follow that it nances the rm. In fact, if
 > (2   2F   p
h
d)
p
`
  p
h
1  p
h
;
the PB will not nance the rm with e = e
h
, contrary to the rst best rule. It may still nance
the rm with e = e
`
. But (2   2F   p
h
d)
p
`
 p
h
1 p
h
>
p
`
 p
h
1 p
h
(p
`
  p
h
)d, as in Figure 1 below, i
2   2F   p
`
d > 0. Otherwise, we have Figure 2.
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FIGURE 1
( = 0 and 2   2F   p
`
d > 0)
 
0
A
p
`
  p
h
1  p
h
(p
`
  p
h
)d
B
(2   2F   p
h
d)
p
`
  p
h
1  p
h
C
(p
`
  p
h
)d
D
 In A, we have e
PB
= e
h
and e
BR
= e
h
, and nancing occurs in both the BR and PB
solutions: no welfare loss in the PB solution.
 In B and C, we have e
PB
= e
`
and e
BR
= e
h
, and nancing occurs in both the BR and
PB solutions: the welfare loss in the PB solution corresponds to the higher than eÆcient
level of accidents.
 In D, we have e
PB
= e
`
and e
BR
= e
`
, and nancing occurs in both the BR and PB
solutions, since 2   2F   p
`
d  0, independently of  which is not paid since e = e
`
:
there is no welfare loss in the PB solution.
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If 2   2F   p
`
d < 0, then we have the following:
-
FIGURE 2
( = 0 and 2   2F   p
`
d < 0)
 
0
A
0
p
`
  p
h
1  p
h
(p
`
  p
h
)d
B
0
(2   2F   p
h
d)
p
`
  p
h
1  p
h
C
0
(p
`
  p
h
)d
D
0
 In A
0
, we have e
PB
= e
h
and e
BR
= e
h
, and nancing occurs in both the BR and PB
solutions: no welfare loss in the PB solution.
 In B
0
, we have e
PB
= e
h
and e
BR
= e
h
, but nancing occurs only in the BR solution: the
welfare loss in the PB solution corresponds to not realizing the investment.
 In C
0
, we have e
PB
= e
`
and e
BR
= e
h
, but nancing occurs only in the BR solution:
again the welfare loss in the PB solution corresponds to not realizing the investment.
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 In D
0
, we have e
PB
= e
`
and e
BR
= e
`
, and nancing occurs in neither the BR nor the PB
solutions: no welfare loss in the PB solution.
Similarly, comparing the solutions under BR and CR for the case 2  2F   p
`
d > 0, we obtain:
-
FIGURE 3
( = 0 and 2   2F   p
`
d > 0)
 
0
E
(p
`
  p
h
)d
G
p
`
  p
h
1  p
h
 K(1  p
`
)
(p
`
  p
h
)d
H
 In E, we have e
CR
= e
h
and e
BR
= e
h
, and nancing occurs in both the BR and CR
solutions: no welfare loss in the CR solution.
 In G, we have e
CR
= e
h
, leaving a rent to the rm, and e
BR
= e
`
, leaving no rent to the
rm, and nancing occurs in both the CR and the BR solutions. The welfare loss in the
CR solution corresponds to a level of accidents that is too low (from the level of care e
h
generating a rent for the rm) !
 In H, we have e
CR
= e
`
and e
BR
= e
`
, and nancing in both the CR and the BR solutions:
no welfare loss in the CR solution.
Rather than proceed with a general analysis of the cases with  > 0, let us consider the following
illustrative numerical example:

L
= 5; 
H
= 10;  = 0:5; F = 5; p
`
= 0:1; p
h
= 0:05; d = 20; K = 1:2
for which  = 7:5 and (p
`
  p
h
)d = 1. For this case, we can graph the frontiers (20) to (25) as
on Figure 4, for ( ; ) 2 f(0; 0); (1; 1)g.
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FIGURE 4
[2   2F   p
`
d  0]
 
6
0

1
1
(p
`
  p
h
)d
(22) (23)(20)(24) (21) (25)



 

Conditions (20), (22) and (24) relate to the decision about the level of care activities, namely
e
BR
= e
h
i  is to the left of (20) for a given , that is, i  is below (20) for a given  ,
e
PB
= e
h
i  is to the left of (22), irrespective of the value of , and e
CR
= e
h
i  is to
the left of (24) for a given , that is, i  is below (24) for a given  . Conditions (21), (23)
and (25) relate to the decision about the investment in the rm, namely BR invests with e
h
i
 is to the left of (21), PB invests with e
h
i  is to the left of (23) and CR invests with e
h
i  is to the left of (25). Therefore, for the example considered, all three principals invest if
indeed they decide to induce e
h
from the rm. When they induce e
`
, they all follow the same
rule since there is then no rent left to the rm, namely they all invest i 2   2F   p
`
d  0.
If we assume that this last condition is satised, then there will always be investment in the
rm. The dierence between the three solutions comes from the dierent decisions regarding
the inducement of care activities. Consider Figure 4. For a situation ( ; ) to the left of (22),
all three principals induce e
h
and invest in the rm: the three solutions are the same. For a
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situation ( ; ) between (22) and (20), e
BR
= e
CR
= e
h
but e
PB
= e
`
, while they all invest in
the rm: in this region, the captured regulator solution is preferred to the private bank solution.
For a situation ( ; ) between (20) and (24), e
BR
= e
PB
= e
`
but e
CR
= e
h
, while they all
invest in the rm: in this region, the private bank solution is preferred to the captured regulator
solution, even if there will be more accidents in the former solution. The larger number, more
precisely the higher probability, of accidents is more than compensated by the fact that there is
no (costly) rent left to the rm. Finally for a situation ( ; ) above (24), all three principals
induce e
`
and invest in the rm: the three solutions are the same. Therefore:
Proposition 4: If 2   2F   p
`
d  0, that is, if the rm is socially protable with a low level of
care, then the `extended lender liability' regime and the `regulator subject to capture' regime are
equivalent instruments for implementing the environmental policy if the dierential cost between
high and low levels of accident prevention activities is relatively small or relatively large (as a
function of the social cost of public funds ), that is, if
 2 () 
"
0;
(p
`
  p
h
)
2
d
1  p
h
#
[
2
6
4
(1 + )(p
`
  p
h
)d
K +
(1  p
h
)(1 +  K)
p
`
  p
h
; 1
3
7
5
[
f
(1 + )(p
`
  p
h
)d
1 + 
1  p
h
p
`
  p
h
g:
The `regulator subject to capture' regime is a better instrument if the dierential cost between
high and low levels of accident prevention activities is in the lower intermediate range, that is,
if
 2 
() 
0
B
@
(p
`
  p
h
)
2
d
1  p
h
;
(1 + )(p
`
  p
h
)d
1 + 
1  p
h
p
`
  p
h
1
C
A
:
The `extended lender liability' regime is a better instrument if the dierential cost between high
and low levels of accident prevention activities is in the higher intermediate range, that is, if
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If investing in the rm is not socially desirable or protable unless e = e
h
is induced, that
is, if 2   2F   p
`
d < 0, we obtain a conguration represented in Figure 5, where p
`
= 0:3, for
( ; ) 2 f(0; 0); (5; 1)g.
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We observe the following. For a situation ( ; ) to the left of (23), all three principals prefer
to induce e
h
and invest in the rm: the three solutions are the same. To the right of (23), the
private bank does not invest anymore because  is too high. For a situation ( ; ) between
(23) and (21), e
BR
= e
CR
= e
h
and both invest in the rm: in this region, the captured regulator
solution is preferred to the private bank solution. To the right of (21), the benevolent regulator
does not invest anymore. Although she would prefer to induce e
h
[for ( ; ) between (21) and
(20)],  is too high and therefore the rent to be left to the rm is too costly. Note that as
expected, the no investment trigger value is decreasing in : the higher the social cost of public
funds, the faster the benevolent regulator stops investing as the dierential cost  increases.
For a situation ( ; ) between (21) and (25), e
CR
= e
h
and the captured regulator is the only
principal still interested in investing in the rm: in this region, the private bank solution is
preferred to the captured regulator solution. Even if the captured regulator induces the high
level of care activities, her decision to invest in the rm is due to her undervaluation of the social
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cost of the rent left to the rm. In this region of parameter space, it is socially better not to
nance the rm. Finally for a situation ( ; ) above (25), none of the three principals invest
in the rm: the three solutions are the same. We obtain a comparison similar to the case of
proposition 4 but with dierent boundaries. We have:
Proposition 5: If 2   2F   p
`
d  0, that is, if the rm is socially protable only with a high
level of care, then the `extended lender liability' regime and the `regulator subject to capture'
regime are equivalent instruments for implementing the environmental policy if the dierential
cost between high and low levels of accident prevention activities is relatively small or relatively
large, that is, if
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The `regulator subject to capture' regime is a better instrument if the dierential cost between
high and low levels of accident prevention activities is in the lower intermediate range, that is,
if
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The `extended lender liability' regime is a better instrument if the dierential cost between high
and low levels of accident prevention activities is in the higher intermediate range, that is, if
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Proposition 6: The region in ( ; )-space over which the captured regulator solution is better
than the extended lender liability solution is independent of K while the region in ( ; )-space
over which the captured regulator solution is worse than the extended lender liability solution
is expanding with K. k
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5 Conclusion and policy implications
We analyzed in this paper a simple model allowing a comparison between dierent instruments
for implementing an eÆcient environmental protection policy. More precisely, we considered a
moral hazard context in which rms can take preventing actions to reduce the probability of
environmental disasters. Those actions being a private information of the rm concerned will
give rise to informational rents whose net social cost is positive because of the existence of a social
cost of public funds. We rst characterized the optimal rules a benevolent welfare maximizing
regulator would choose regarding the level of care activities a given rm should be exercising
and the condition for nancing the rm. Those rules dier from the rst best rules because
the maximization of social welfare requires that the regulator minimizes the informational rent
of the rm. We then compared the benevolent regulator solution rules to those rules a private
bank would apply under the extended lender liability of the CERCLA type and to those rules
a captured regulator, overestimating the contribution of the informational rent of the rm to
social welfare, would choose.
The comparison of the three sets of rules led us to identify the region in the ( ; )-space
where the captured regulator rules and the CERCLA-liable private bank rules are equivalent to
the benevolent regulator rules, the region where the captured regulator rules are better in terms
of social welfare attained to the CERCLA-liable private bank rules, and nally the region where
the CERCLA-liable private bank rules are better.
Our main results are summarized in proposition 4 for the case where the rm is socially
protable when the level of care is high or low and in proposition 5 for the case where the rm
is socially protable only if the level of care is high. In general, the captured regulator solution
is better if the deterministic characteristic location of the economy in the ( ; )-space falls
in the lower intermediate range, that is if  2 
() [or  2
^

()] and the CERCLA-liable
private bank solution is better if the deterministic characteristic location of the economy falls
in the higher intermediate range, that is if  2  () [or  2
^
 ()]. It is interesting to note
that the former region is independent of the capture parameter K while the latter region is
expanding with increases in K: if the captured regulator's overestimation of the contribution of
the informational rent to social welfare increases, within its reasonable interval, then the upper
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boundary of the region in ( ; )-space where the CERCLA-liable private bank solution rules
are better than the captured regulator's rules [condition (24) in proposition 4 and condition (25)
in proposition 5] moves up.
The main conclusion of this paper is therefore that choosing between a regulation framework
and a legal framework to implement an environmental protection policy is not an easy matter.
But our analysis provides some preliminary steps in determining a way to analyze such a choice.
So the answer to the question regarding which instruments should be employed by the policy
makers is that a case by case examination is required. But, some of the important determinants
of the relative eÆciency with which dierent policy instruments maximize social welfare function
have been characterized.
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